The Scottish Independence Referendum and After by Keating, Michael
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
73
THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE 
REFERENDUM AND AFTER
Michael Keating
Professor of Politics at the University of Aberdeen, and director of the Centre on 
Constitutional Change
SUMMARY: The Scottish Dilemma. – Constitutional Traditions in Scotland. – The Na-
tionalists in Government. – The Battle Ground. – Economy and Finance. – Welfare. 
– Defence and Security. – Europe. – The Campaign. – The Outcome. – The Aftermath. 
– The Smith Report. – EVEL and Barnett. – The European Context. – The Future of 
the State. – Abstract – Resum – Resumen.
The Scottish Dilemma
The Scottish independence referendum on 18 September 2014 was 
a highly unusual event, an agreed popular vote on secession in an 
advanced industrial democracy. The result, with 45 per cent for in-
dependence and 55 per cent against, might seem to have settled the 
question decisively. Yet, paradoxically, it is the losing side that has 
emerged in better shape and more optimistic, while the winners have 
been plunged into difficulties. In order to understand what has hap-
pened, we need to examine the referendum in light of the evolution 
of the United Kingdom and the changing place of Scotland within it. 
Scotland should be seen as a case of the kind of spatial rescaling that 
is taking place more generally across Europe, as new forms of state-
hood and of sovereignty evolve. Scottish public opinion favours more 
self-government but no longer recognizes the traditional nation-state 
model presented in the referendum question.
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Constitutional Traditions in Scotland
Since the late nineteenth century union, there have been three main 
constitutional traditions in Scotland. The first is unionism, a distinctly 
British doctrine developed after the union of Scotland and England 
in 1707.1 Unionists are strongly committed to the maintenance of the 
United Kingdom and historically favoured a unitary parliament at 
Westminster, with no concession of political power to the nations of 
Ireland, Scotland or Wales. Yet unionists are not Jacobins in the conti-
nental sense and have always recognized the reality of national diver-
sity within the state. So they have no problem with the vocabulary of 
nation to describe Scotland, nor with the symbols of nationality or the 
existence of a distinct civil society. They accepted the perpetuation of 
distinct Scottish institutions, including the criminal and civil law and 
the education system, which never unified across the United Kingdom. 
It is precisely because they accept that Scotland is a nation, however, 
that they historically refused to countenance autonomy, arguing that 
the combination of nationality and self-government would inevitably 
lead to separation.2 During the twentieth century, the Labour Party 
added another element to the unionist argument, that the unitary 
state was essential in order to secure social welfare. 
The second tradition is that of Home Rule or, as it was called 
from the mid-twentieth century, devolution. This favours Scottish self-
government within a reformed United Kingdom and was first formu-
lated in the late nineteenth century following demands for Irish home 
rule. As adapted by the Liberal Party, it took the form of a federal 
reform, starting with Ireland and Scotland but eventually intended to 
lead to Home Rule All Round. The idea had significant support in the 
Labour Party and some support even within the Conservative Party. 
Although it has consistently been the preferred choice of a majority 
of Scottish electors (in surveys since the 1960s and when it has been 
presented at elections), the main parties subordinated it to their un-
ionist preferences until the late twentieth century.
The third tradition is the independentist one, seeking a separate 
nation state. This was insignificant before the 1930s, when the first 
independence-seeking parties emerged and was not a serious op-
tion before the 1970s when the Scottish National Party (SNP) began 
1. Colin Kidd, Union and Unionisms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
2. Michael Keating, The Independence of Scotland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
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to make electoral progress. Usually, independence has been placed 
within a broader framework, such as the Commonwealth or, in recent 
decades, the European Union, rather than being presented as radical 
separatism. As a result, the lines between advanced home rulers and 
moderate independentists have been blurred. Within the SNP there 
was a division between the ‘fundamentalists’ who wanted complete 
independence immediately, and the ‘gradualists’, who were happy to 
proceed first with devolution. 
After a failed attempt in the 1970s, devolution finally came 
about in 1999, after Labour had returned to power with a large ma-
jority. It was the experience of being governed for eighteen years by 
a Conservative Party for which Scots had not voted that proved the 
decisive factor and the 1997 referendum providing for devolution was 
carried by a majority of three to one. Unionists accepted the verdict so 
that the unionist and home rule traditions appeared to converge. For 
their part, the fundamentalists and gradualists in the SNP put aside 
their differences on the grounds that they could travel together in the 
next stage, towards independence. It was not long, however, before 
a new ‘middle ground’ emerged in the form of demands for further 
devolution, sometimes known as ‘devolution-max’ or ‘devo-max’. The 
Scottish Parliament established in 1999 has extensive and exclusive 
powers over wide areas of domestic policy but lacks substantial fiscal 
powers and powers over redistributive welfare payments and these 
are the core of further devolution demands. 
The Nationalists in Government
The Scottish Parliament is elected according to the added-member 
system of proportional representation, which makes it difficult for 
any one party to gain a majority of seats. After the elections of 1999 
and 2003, coalition governments of Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
were formed. In 2007, the SNP came ahead by one seat and formed 
a minority government. They had promised to hold an independ-
ence referendum but were unable to gain the necessary parliamen-
tary support. The unionist parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat),3 on the other hand, established their own commission (the 
3. Unionist is a term historically used for the Conservative Party, and refers to its sup-
port for the union with Ireland and its merger with the old Liberal Unionists who split 
from Gladstone over Irish home rule. In Scotland, the term Unionist was used instead of 
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Calman Commission) and pushed through a modest extension of fiscal 
powers for Scotland, as their response to the SNP threat. 
In 2011, the SNP achieved the difficult feat of gaining an abso-
lute majority and pressed ahead with their independence plans. It is 
important to note that this victory was not the result of an increase 
in Scottish identity among the population, or even in support for 
independence. It has long been the case that most Scots, whether 
nationalist or unionist, feel more Scottish than British but this number 
was actually falling both in 2007 and in 2011 (according to the Scottish 
Social Attitudes Survey) 4. Support for independence had historically 
run at around 20 per cent but during the 1990s it had increased to 
around 30 per cent, in reaction to the domination of British politics 
by the Conservatives, who had steadily lost support in Scotland (and 
lost all their remaining seats there in 1997). In 2007 and again 2011 
independence support was falling,5 one reason apparently being that 
voters thought that the SNP were doing a good job making devolution 
work. The SNP victory was, rather, due to the perception that they 
were a competent government, which was able to take decisions on 
its own, without looking to Westminster as Labour had seemed to 
do. The 2011 victory did, however, give the SNP a mandate to proceed 
with an independence referendum, although this is a matter reserved 
constitutionally to Westminster.
 It was the confidence that there was no majority support for 
independence that prompted the unionist parties accept the SNP chal-
lenge and agree to a referendum as a means of settling the question. 
The 2012 Edinburgh Agreement provided that power be given to the 
Scottish Parliament (under section 30 of the Scotland Act) to hold a 
referendum but on conditions. The power was temporary, expiring 
after 2014. There would be only one question, on independence, and 
the question should be a clear one, which would specify the choice of 
independence or union, with no second option for enhanced devolu-
tion. This was significant because opinion polls indicated that such a 
‘devo-max’ option was the one supported by the largest number of 
Conservative until 1965. Its adoption by the Labour Party is recent and perhaps surprising 
in view of its historic connotations. The Liberal Democrats are usually now described as 
unionist although they themselves insist on their Gladstonian roots and call themselves 
federalists. 
4. http://www.natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/scottish-social-attitudes/
5. Scottish Social Attitudes Survey http://www.natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/scot-
tish-social-attitudes/
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voters and the second preference of most others. The SNP had indi-
cated that, while devo-max was not its policy, it would have allowed 
it on the ballot paper. 
The table shows the distribution of preferences in 2012. The first 
option is equivalent to independence, although not using that term 
has raised support above the normal level for the times. The second 
option corresponds to most definitions of devo-max, while the third 
option is the status quo. 
Constitutional Options 2012 Per Cent
Scottish Parliament make all decisions 35
UK Government decide defence and foreign affairs, Scottish Parliament the rest 32
UK Government decide taxes, benefits and defence and foreign affairs 24
UK Government decide everything   6
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey.
The ensuing referendum question was devised by the Scottish 
Government and put before the independent Electoral Commission, 
which made some minor changes and there was rapid agreement be-
tween the two sides on ‘Should Scotland be an independent country? 
Yes/No.’ This is certainly a clear question as far as the words go. The 
meaning, however, is less clear. Independence is a difficult concept in 
the modern world and the choice of ‘country’ rather than ‘state’ might 
be questioned (although the Electoral Commission tested it with the 
public, who seemed to have little difficulty).
The Battle Ground
The Edinburgh Agreement resolved the legal and constitutional issue 
from the outset, so that this hardly featured in the debate, except in 
regard to Europe. Another remarkable feature of this referendum 
campaign was the lack of distance between the two sides in the vision 
of Scotland they presented. This in large part explains the fact that the 
independence question did not provoke a deep social division within 
Scotland but rather disagreements on how to get to the same place. 
This is, to an extent, true even on the constitutional issue itself. The 
‘third way’ option of devo-max had been ruled out by the unionists 
and was not the policy of the nationalists but, knowing that this is 
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where public opinion clustered, both sides sought to get as close to 
this position as possible. 
On the Yes side, the SNP and the Scottish Government presented 
a rather attenuated form of independence, which retained much of 
the infrastructure of the union. Critically, Scotland would retain the 
Pound Sterling in monetary union with the rest of the United Kingdom 
(rUK) although this would entail surrendering control of monetary 
policy and entering into a fiscal pact with rUK, similar to arrangements 
in the Euro zone. 
For their part, the unionist parties abandoned their defence of 
the status quo and set up commissions to produce plans for further 
devolution. The most far-reaching were those of the Liberal Demo-
crats, who have a long commitment to a federal United Kingdom and 
who proposed to devolve all income tax and various other taxes. The 
Conservatives also proposed devolution of income tax, while Labour 
was the least adventurous, agreeing only to devolve a quarter of in-
come tax (in addition to the half that is already due to be devolved in 
2016 under the Calman proposals). All of these proposals were short 
of devo-max as defined in the table above, but they did represent a 
move towards the centre. 
Two crucial discursive elements featured throughout the cam-
paign. The first was that of Scotland and which side incarnates it bet-
ter. This is natural ground for the nationalists but there is a strong 
element of national distinctiveness in Scottish unionism, which has 
never denied that Scotland is a national reality with its own culture 
and traditions but argues that these can be preserved better in the 
union. Most unionists feel strongly Scottish, except for a small minority 
(well under 10 per cent of the voters) who feel only British. Faced with 
the SNP challenge, however, the unionists have lost their instinctive 
sense of Scottishness and tended to stress Britishness as somehow the 
superior identity, incarnating fundamental values such as democracy, 
fairness and solidarity, apparently reducing Scottishness to a mere 
cultural variation. This was particularly the case with the Labour Party, 
who insisted that values of fairness and solidarity were somehow es-
sentially British.6 The Conservatives, for their part, had lost the ability 
to talk the language of Scottish patriotism which they possessed a 
generation ago and had, partly as a result, been reduced to a minor-
6. The best exposition of this Labour view of Britishness and of welfare unionism is in 
Gordon Brown, My Scotland, Our Britain, London: Simon and Schuster, 2014.
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ity party widely seen as not quite Scottish. The Yes side, for its part, 
projected a modern, civic notion of Scottish identity shorn of ethnic 
particularism, embracing immigration and multiculturalism and sus-
tained by groups such as Africans for an Independent Scotland, Asian 
Scots for Independence or Scots Asians for Yes.
The second field is union, natural territory for the unionists, but 
they have in recent years lost their understanding of what unionism 
means in the United Kingdom. Unionism historically succeeded in the 
United Kingdom by taking different forms in different parts of the 
kingdom, resting upon different social alliances. Any effort to unify 
and essentialize it is doomed to fail, as did the ‘Britishness’ campaigns 
of the New Labour Government (1997-2010). First Minister and SNP 
leader Alex Salmond captured the old unionist spirit much better, 
and was able to make the historical and literary allusions to sustain 
it. He even famously declared that Scotland was currently part of six 
unions – political, monarchical, monetary, defence, European and so-
cial – and that the nationalists proposed to withdraw only from the 
political union, retaining the other five. The monarchical union is not 
problematic as it stems from an event in 1603 when the king of Scot-
land ascended to the throne of England (not the other way round). 
The British monarch is also head of state of some fifteen independ-
ent countries in the Commonwealth. The social union was not clearly 
defined, and might cover anything from the fact that families would 
still retain links across the border, to the idea of common social rights. 
The other ones are discussed below. All of this allowed the Yes side to 
shrug off accusations of separatism and bring reassurance to voters. 
Because the issue of the right to self-determination had been 
resolved (at least on a temporary basis) by the Edinburgh Agreement, 
the campaign focused on the social, economic and security implica-
tions of independence and union. 
Economy and Finance
The most important questions revolved around the economic conse-
quences of independence. Scotland is neither a rich nor a poor part of 
the United Kingdom; its Gross Domestic Product per capita has in re-
cent years been around 97 per cent of the average, lower than London 
and the South East but higher than other regions. The SNP has long 
argued that, with independence, it could join the ‘arc of prosperity’ 
of small, successful states in north-western Europe, which at one time 
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included the Nordic countries and Ireland. After the economic crisis 
of 2008 and the crash in Ireland and Iceland, unionists lampooned 
this as the ‘arc of insolvency’, an equally misleading expression, since 
the other Nordic states came through the crisis rather well. In fact, 
the experiences of small northern European states have been rather 
different from each other, with both positive and negative lessons 
for Scotland but this was not explored in great detail.7 There were 
references in the Scottish Government’s independence white paper8 to 
social investment and partnership but these were not well developed.
Unionists laid great stress on the risks of independence. They 
insisted that an independent Scotland would not have been able to 
bail out its banks in 2008 and that two of the largest banks, Royal Bank 
of Scotland and Bank of Scotland are both officially Scottish-based. 
In fact, both have most of their operations in England and, since the 
crash, are largely owned by the UK Government; in addition Bank of 
Scotland is part of the larger Lloyds conglomerate. The SNP remained 
vulnerable on the point, however, since it had supported the over-ex-
pansion of the banks since the 1990s and was not prepared to say that 
the banks should be allowed to fail. The arguments about the risks of 
independence reached a peak in the last week of the campaign, when 
the No side encouraged a stream of banks and businesses to issue dire 
warnings about relocating and disinvesting – some supermarket chains 
even warned that they would put up prices if Scotland voted Yes.
There was an extensive argument about public finances. For his-
toric reasons, Scottish levels of public expenditure have been higher 
than the UK average at least since the 1960s. In the late 1970s, in an-
ticipation of devolution (which did not happen at that time) a formula 
was introduced (the Barnett Formula) providing that most Scottish 
expenditure would take the form of a single block, which would vary 
according to increases or decreases in English expenditure on the same 
functions.9 So future changes in expenditure would be proportional 
to population but the historic base would remain. Over time, this 
should have produced convergence in expenditure levels but in prac-
tice Scottish expenditures remain significantly higher, leading to some 
7. It is analysed in Michael Keating and Malcolm Harvey, Small Nations in a Big World. 
What Scotland Can Learn, Edinburgh: Luath, 2014.
8. Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future. Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, Ed-
inburgh: Scottish Government, 2013.
9. Michael Keating. The Government of Scotland. Public Policy after Devolution, 2nd edn., 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.
The Scottish Independence Referendum and After
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
81
grievance elsewhere in the UK. After devolution, Barnett continued in 
the form of a block grant to the Scottish Parliament, accounting for 
almost all its revenues. 
Unionists argued that, without Barnett, Scotland could not pay 
for its own public services. Effectively, they said that Scotland got more 
than its share of spending and that, after a No vote, this would con-
tinue. This is not an argument that plays well in England or in Wales 
(which does badly out of Barnett) and this caused problems for the 
UK parties there. The Labour Party also argued that Barnett distrib-
utes revenue according to need, which is in fact not the case.10 The 
Yes side responded that, taking North Sea oil revenues into account, 
Scotland has generally paid its own way and that its public finances, 
while notionally in deficit since the crisis of 200811, would not be as 
bad as those of the United Kingdom. Oil has featured in the inde-
pendence debate since the 1990s. It is generally accepted that some 
90 per cent of the oil reserves are in Scottish waters, a proportion 
that might even increase as new discoveries are exploited west of the 
Shetland Islands. The weakness in this argument is that the Scottish 
Government also planned to set up an oil fund like that in Norway, to 
use the oil revenues to even out economic fluctuations, and to build 
long-term reserves. They could not simultaneously be used to cover 
current expenditure needs. 
In principle, an independent Scotland could have three currency 
options: to adopt its own currency; to enter the Euro; and to share 
the Pound Sterling with rUK. The SNP (and hence the Scottish Govern-
ment) adopted the last of these, although the Greens and the left of 
the independence movement did not. By the time of the Edinburgh 
Agreement, experience in the Euro zone had shown that monetary 
union is very difficult without a measure of fiscal union, at least in 
the form of controls over deficits and debt. Fiscal union in turn is dif-
ficult without political union. The Scottish Government accepted much 
of this reasoning but proposed a monetary union in which Scotland 
would share the currency, with a role in the management of monetary 
10. Scottish Labour Party, Powers for a Purpose. Strengthening Accountability and Em-
powering People, Glasgow: Scottish Labour Party, 2013, p.37, ‘An equitable system of 
grant distribution – to Scotland, and indeed Wales and Northern Ireland – is a key aspect 
in the UK’s social union.’
11. There is not an actual deficit since Scotland must balance its budget. These are notion-
al figures calculated by independent civil servants in the series Government Revenues and 
Expenditures in Scotland, which adds up all public expenditure and revenue in Scotland. 
Michael Keating
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
82
policy. The UK parties, which otherwise tended to avoid saying what 
they would do in the event of a Yes vote, made an exception here and 
declared that they would not countenance a monetary union under 
any circumstances. The SNP insisted that this was a bluff and that 
rUK would realise that it was in its own interest to have such a union. 
While SNP leaders refused to say what their ‘Plan B’ was in the event 
that rUK did refuse a monetary union, it was tacitly accepted that in 
that case they would use the Pound unilaterally. This might have been 
possible but it would have left Scotland with no influence at all over 
its monetary policy. 
Welfare
Another central issue in the campaign was welfare. This is natural 
territory for the Labour Party, but has a broad appeal across Scot-
land, where most of the political parties (Labour, SNP, Liberal Demo-
crats, Greens and the leftist Scottish Socialist Party) are in the social 
democratic fold. The UK Government has been undertaking a radical 
reform of welfare, which has become increasingly controversial. The 
SNP combines a commitment to social democracy with a pro-business 
stance in a way that has caused some tensions in the past. During the 
referendum campaign, however, it staked its ground on defending 
the post-war British welfare settlement, accusing Labour of not be-
ing able to stand up for Scotland or for the poor. Again, the Nordic 
states, combining economic prosperity with social cohesion, were the 
inspiration. For its part, the Labour Party insisted that welfare was 
inherently British, as the UK state was needed to equalize conditions 
and provide against asymmetrical shocks and that affective solidarity 
was at the level of the British nation.12
The focus on welfare allowed the Yes side to extend the inde-
pendence coalition well beyond the core nationalist constituency 
to embrace most of the non-Labour left, sections of the Labour 
Party itself, part of the trade union movement and a large swathe 
of the voluntary sector. There was a contradiction in the SNP posi-
tion, since it also favoured cuts to corporation tax (to attract in-
ward investment) and air transport taxation and promised not to 
increase other taxes, putting its ‘Nordic’ credentials into question. 
12. Again, this is articulated in Gordon Brown, My Scotland, Our Britain.
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Labour tried to exploit this contradiction but at the risk of raising 
questions about whether it would find the tax income to finance a 
social democratic welfare state if it were in power. Other elements 
of the Yes coalition were less inhibited, as its left-wing components 
rejected corporation tax cuts. This included the Green Party but 
also civil society groups like the Common Weal (the campaigning 
arm of the think tank The Jimmy Reid Foundation) and the Radical 
Independence Collective. 
Defence and Security
Defence is a sensitive issue within the SNP, which has a significant paci-
fist and, especially, anti-nuclear tradition dating from the 1960s. In-
deed, many activists had left the Labour Party and joined the SNP over 
precisely this issue. Before the referendum, the party had changed its 
historic opposition to NATO membership, and thus gained credibility 
for its independence project by providing assurances about security 
and reducing risk. This, however, provoked one of the few open divi-
sions in the party in recent years and three of its parliamentarians left 
the party to sit as independents. Even more sensitive is the question of 
nuclear weapons. The UK’s nuclear deterrent (Trident) is based entirely 
in Scotland and a decision is imminent on whether and how to renew 
it. SNP policy is that Scotland should be nuclear-free, meaning that the 
Trident system would have to be withdrawn. Since there is no obvi-
ous place elsewhere in the UK to put the base, this could have caused 
real problems. There were suggestions that Trident could be traded 
off against keeping the Pound but the sensitivity of the nuclear issue 
within the SNP made this difficult and the unionist parties seemed 
determined not to compromise on the currency. 
The Scottish Government’s white paper proposed that Scot-
land would have military forces based on existing UK assets. There 
would be a naval base on the west coast, using the current Trident 
facilities. Scotland would meet its NATO commitments and look after 
home defence. Other analysts, however, proposed a more radical 
reformulation of defence policy, based on a limited set of strategic 
goals including protection of the oil fields (moving the naval base 
to the east coast), filling the gap in NATO surveillance left by the 
UK’s decision to withdraw its Nimrod aircraft, and not sustaining 
an expeditionary capacity. These issues did not, in practice, feature 
prominently in the campaign. 
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Europe
One issue that did keep on coming back was whether, and how, Scot-
land could be a member of the European Union. After opposing UK 
membership of the (then) European Economic Community in the early 
1970s, the SNP changed tack in the late 1980s and has since used Eu-
rope as an essential external support for an independent Scotland. 
By the time of the referendum, the SNP was the most strongly pro-
European party in the United Kingdom. There were some early sug-
gestions that an independent Scotland would automatically remain 
within the EU but by the time of Edinburgh Agreement the Scottish 
Government recognized that rUK would remain as the member state 
and Scotland would have to accede. Two mechanisms were suggested. 
Scotland could apply to join as a new member state using article 49 
of the Treaty of European Union. Alternatively, given that the terri-
tory and people of Scotland are already in the Union, article 48 could 
be used to effect a treaty change recognising Scotland as the 29th 
member state. 
The position of the No side was less clear. They did not explicitly 
say that Scotland would be excluded from the EU but came as close 
to this as possible. There were warnings that either procedure would 
require the assent of all existing member states and that some states 
might exercise a veto. It was usually implied that this would be Spain, 
fearing for the implications for Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
In fact the Spanish government was very worried indeed about the 
contagion of independence but never said that they would veto Scot-
land’s membership of the EU. This would have been to admit that it 
was a precedent for Catalonia, something they were at pains to deny, 
pointing out the UK law allowed Scotland to vote for independence 
while Spanish law has no equivalent. At other times, unionists sug-
gested that Scotland would have to leave the EU for a time and then 
might be readmitted. Finally, they argued that, even if Scotland were 
allowed in, it would have to join the Euro and the Schengen travel 
area and would lose the various UK opt-outs. 
When challenged about the prospect of Scotland being excluded 
from the EU, unionists always retreated, but then shortly afterwards 
would return to the same point. There are good reasons for thinking 
that Scotland would be in the EU. The first is a matter of democratic 
principle and European practice. An independent Scotland would be 
recognized by its former host state, the United Kingdom so there is 
no reason for any other European country withholding recognition 
The Scottish Independence Referendum and After
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
85
(there is certainly no precedent for this). As an independent, recog-
nized democracy compliant with the Copenhagen entry criteria and 
the acquis communautaire, Scotland could hardly be excluded just 
because it had exercised a democratic, legal and constitutional right. 
In a continent where nationality claims have proved so difficult to 
resolve, it would give a very bad signal to refuse the case of a nation 
that had addressed its national question in such an eminently peaceful 
and democratic way. The second reason for Scotland being allowed in 
is a matter of mutual convenience. Creating a gap in the single market 
and other European structures would be against the interests of rUK, 
other member states, business and citizens. It would be particularly 
absurd to spend time and effort disentangling Scotland from the EU, 
only to spend more time and effort getting back in again. 
The Yes side had another argument to deploy, in the promise by 
the Conservative Party to have a referendum in 2017 on whether the 
UK should withdraw from the EU. Independence supporters argued 
that Scotland risked being dragged out of Europe against its will if, 
in such a referendum England voted to come out and Scotland to 
stay in. Opinion polls suggested that this was a real possibility. There 
is less visceral Euroscepticism in Scotland, the United Kingdom Inde-
pendence Part (UKIP) is a minor presence and there is a shared com-
mitment across Scottish civil society to the European project. Being 
pro-European does not carry the political penalty it does in England, 
something that the SNP has exploited to the full. 
The Campaign
The campaign was conducted according to agreed rules, which recog-
nized two official bodies, Yes, Scotland (including the SNP, the Greens 
and Scottish Socialists) for independence and Better Together (includ-
ing the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties) for the 
union. There were spending limits for each side and for the political 
parties and other campaign groups. It had been expected that spend-
ing would favour the No side, as they had support of business and 
wealthy backers but the fortuitous circumstance that an independ-
ence-supporting couple from Ayrshire won £161 million in the Euromil-
lions lottery levelled the field. They provided some 80 per cent of the 
finance for Yes Scotland. 
What was not anticipated at the beginning of the process was 
the high degree of public engagement that developed. This was less 
Michael Keating
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
86
the work of the official campaigns and the parties than of groups 
within civil society. Indeed, the campaign operated at two distinct 
levels. There was the ‘air war’ by the official Yes and No campaigns, 
marked by a mass of statistical evidence and carried on through the 
printed and broadcast media. There were two debates between Alex 
Salmond and Alistair Darling (former Labour minister and leader of 
the No campaign). Darling was adjudged the winner of the first and 
Salmond of the second. At another level was the ‘ground war’ fought 
in communities and through social media, which largely escaped the 
control of the two official campaigns. This was marked by an extraor-
dinary level of engagement – it was estimated that some ten per cent 
of the population had participated in public meetings. Here Yes sup-
porters, including those outside the SNP, were omnipresent and the 
No campaign strangely absent. The result was a public debate about 
the future of the country going well beyond narrow constitutional 
questions and which reflected the lack of trust in conventional politics 
found right across Europe these days. The Yes side was much more 
present and visible in this ground war, while the No side concentrated 
on the official campaign.
Generally speaking, the business community favoured a No vote 
but organized business was less clear. The main employers’ body, the 
Confederation of British Industry (Scotland) (CBI) registered as No sup-
porters but this was met with a spate of resignations from public bod-
ies (including the BBC and universities), which are not allowed to take 
political positions, as well as some independence-supporting business 
people. It then turned out that the CBI had not registered properly in 
any case, and the incident did it no credit. A smaller group, Business 
for Scotland supported Yes. Research on business attitudes indicated 
that, while business was generally against independence, those firms 
that depended on UK markets (as opposed to Scottish or global ones) 
were particularly concerned.13 The trade unions were divided, leading 
most of them to adopt a position of neutrality. Some trade unionists 
supported Labour for Yes, a group of Labour Party dissidents in favour 
of independence. University academics were mostly neutral but there 
were organized groups on each side, Academics for Yes and Academics 
Together. Smaller groups were active in other professions. There was 
13. David Bell and M. McGoldrick, Scottish Independence: Analysing Views from the Oil 
and Gas Sectors, www.futureukandscotland.ac.uk, 214. Brad Mackay., The Scottish Inde-
pendence Debate: Evidence from Business, www.futureukandscotland.ac.uk 
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widespread support for Yes in the voluntary sector, although most 
groups did not take sides officially. 
Much of the detailed argumentation came not from the two 
campaign groups but from the two governments, which were able 
to use their civil servants to prepare their positions. This raised some 
delicate constitutional issues, given the convention that civil servants 
are politically neutral and must serve successive governments of dif-
ferent persuasions. On the other hand, there is the convention that 
they must serve the agenda of ministers. Both governments took the 
view that it was right for their civil servants to follow their agenda, 
although there was more explicit political support for this in the case 
of the UK, as the issue of Scottish independence is hardly controversial 
at Westminster as it is in Scotland. The Scottish Government produced 
a 649-page white paper setting out the case for independence14, while 
the UK Treasury issued a series of Scotland Analysis papers.15 
The most notable feature of the campaign was the trend in 
opinion polls, with a twenty-point advantage for the No side at the 
beginning of the campaign disappearing by the last week, when the 
two sides appeared evenly balanced.16 Clearly, the Yes side had won 
the campaigning if not the final vote. In the last weekend, there were 
even polls showing a small lead for Yes (albeit within the margin of 
error), which caused panic in the No side. Business at Westminster 
was suspended to allow MPs to decamp to Scotland and former Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown intervened to persuade the leaders of the 
three unionist parties to make a ‘vow’ that, if No won, then substan-
tial additional powers would be delivered to Scotland in advance of 
the next UK General Election in May 2015. Precisely, the promised to 
produce agreement on a package by 30 November (St Andrew’s Day), 
a firm programme by 25 January (Burns Night) and a bill before the 
UK General Election in May 2015. This represented a major shift since 
the unionist side, having refused a second question on additional pow-
ers (or devo-max) in the referendum, now seemed to changing the 
meaning of No to mean exactly this – after 20 per cent of the electors 
had already voted by post.
14. Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future.
15. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/scotland-analysis
16. The trends can be followed in What Scotland Thinks, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/
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The Outcome
The final vote was 45 per cent in favour and 55 per cent against in-
dependence. This represents a clear victory for No but by a much 
narrower margin than originally anticipated. Indeed we might won-
der whether the unionist parties would have accepted the Edinburgh 
Agreement if they had known that the polls would narrow so much.
Support for Yes and No was spread across all social categories and 
regions but with some significant differences. Pending the results of the 
referendum study, we must rely here largely on opinion polls during 
the campaign. The biggest difference is between those born in Scotland 
and those born elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Native-born Scots 
were about twice as likely as the latter to vote Yes (which still means 
that about a quarter of the English-born support independence). Those 
born outside the UK (mostly Commonwealth and EU citizens) voted 
more like the native Scots. Men register about ten per cent more sup-
port for independence than women, a finding that has been consist-
ent for a long time. Lower income people and those living in deprived 
neighbourhoods are more likely to vote Yes than are the more affluent. 
Both of these findings are related to risk aversion, women being more 
risk-averse than men (for reasons we do not yet understand) and lower 
income people having less to lose. There is an age gradient, with people 
over 65 voting massively No, although the very youngest (between 16 
and 18) do not seem to be strongly pro-Yes. 
The Aftermath
The result was a clear victory for No, which appeared to settle the issue 
for a generation. Politically, however, it appeared more of a victory 
for Yes, who looked in better form afterwards. Indeed the curious 
spectacle is that the losing side behaved like winners while the win-
ners behaved like losers. Membership of the SNP increased more than 
fourfold within a few weeks, while the pro-independence Greens also 
massively expanded. The leader of the Scottish Labour Party, on the 
other hand, resigned, accusing the UK Labour party of treating the 
Scottish one like a branch office. Some No campaigners, unwilling to 
accept responsibility for losing their massive lead, suggested, as they 
had during the campaign, that they had been subjected to intimida-
tion by Yes supporters. Academics for Yes had suggested that intimi-
dation had even been practised within universities. The only evidence 
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for this was an incident in which an SNP minister had complained 
about a professor who ran a neutral forum on the referendum also 
appearing on a No platform. The worse atrocity of the campaign was 
an egg thrown at Labour politician Jim Murphy. The intimidation story 
was, rather, an effort to create a narrative about foul play in order to 
sustain unionist morale.
It was also a response to the fundamental change the refer-
endum produced in Scottish politics. In the days before devolution, 
Scotland was run by an enlightened bureaucracy in the Scottish Of-
fice, under the aegis of the Secretary of State for Scotland, a Cabinet 
minister of the ruling party. Their role was to apply UK policy in Scot-
land, making whatever adjustments were necessary to sell it; and to 
lobby for Scotland within the UK Government. There was a democratic 
deficit in that parliamentarians at Westminster paid little attention 
to Scottish affairs and would vote through policies for Scotland, even 
when they might rebel on equivalent English matters. Scottish min-
isters were not in Scotland for most of the week, so that ministerial 
control was weak. Scotland did quite well in the distribution of public 
spending, for historic reasons and because of the role of the Secretary 
of State in the UK Cabinet, while regional policy diverted significant 
investments to Scotland. Until the 1970s, local government, increas-
ingly dominated by the Labour Party, distributed patronage in the 
form of publicly-owned houses and jobs. This all ensured that Scotland 
was rather a depoliticised space, especially when Labour was in power. 
During the eighteen years of Conservative government between 1979 
and 1997, a sense of political alienation grew as Scotland was faced 
with radical policies for which it had not voted, and the Conservatives 
steadily lost support and in 1997 won no seats at all in Scotland. The 
Scottish Parliament did restore legitimacy for government in Scotland 
and reduced alienation, but was not noted for bold policy innovation 
and the UK parties remained dominant. The referendum campaign 
changed all this, repoliticizing the country to an extraordinary degree 
and shaking the old political and administrative classes. It is this that 
explains their reaction to the campaign, even it they won the vote. 
The constitution may not have changed but the political system did.
Since the 1980s, Labour has been the only party with a substan-
tial presence and able to win victories in all parts of Great Britain.17 
17. Great Britain consists of England, Scotland and Wales. The United Kingdom extends 
to Northern Ireland, which has its own party system.
Michael Keating
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
90
It has thus played a key role in keeping the political system together. 
Now it faces a serious challenge from the SNP, on both the ideological 
flank, as another social democratic party, and on the territorial flank, 
as the party standing up for Scotland. Labour is particularly discom-
forted since it knows that over a third of its voters opted for Yes and 
it lost traditional working class industrial strongholds like Dundee, 
Glasgow and North Lanarkshire, all of which voted Yes. As the political 
centre ground has shifted in the direction of support for more Scottish 
self-government, the Labour Party still finds itself on the defensive, 
unable to take leadership of the issue.
The SNP, for its part, is positioning itself not just as a party for 
independence but as an actor in UK politics. Alex Salmond resigned 
as leader after the referendum and subsequently announced plans to 
return as a Westminster MP in the General Election of 2005. He also in-
dicated that the SNP would be open to cooperation with other parties 
at Westminster, excluding only coalition with the Conservatives. This 
recalls the strategies of the Basque Nationalist Party and the Catalan 
Convergència i Unió in the past, of negotiating concessions in Madrid 
in return for parliamentary support, although in the case of the SNP 
it is only the Labour Party that would be available. In this respect, 
it has a precedent in the strategy of the Irish Party in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, keeping alive home rule hopes 
in Ireland while assisting the British Liberal Party. At UK level, Labour 
might be open to deals with the SNP but it could pose problems for 
Labour in Scotland, which remains in fierce competition with the SNP 
for essentially the same share of the electorate.
The Smith Report
Following the referendum, the unionist parties sought to keep their 
promise for more powers, appointing a facilitator, Lord Smith, to bro-
ker an agreement in the agreed timetable. This was widely criticized 
as an effort by the Westminster parties to agree a deal among them-
selves, with no time for public input or indeed a mature considera-
tion of how their proposals might work. As the independence issue 
had been debated as such length while more devolution had been 
excluded from the Edinburgh Agreement, this was interpreted as a 
return of the ‘old style’ politics. The SNP proposal asked for more or 
less all powers over domestic policy, while declaring that it would ac-
cept whatever it was offered, even if fell short of its full demands. It 
The Scottish Independence Referendum and After
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
91
did not, therefore, put forward a realistic set of proposals that might 
have allowed it to meet the unionists half way. The three unionist par-
ties put forward the proposals they had broached in their own internal 
commissions, ruling out a more fundamental consideration of matters 
like the best allocation of taxation and welfare powers. 
Smith reported on 28 November 2014.18 Its main recommenda-
tion was that the Scottish Parliament should collect all income tax on 
salaries in Scotland, with discretion over the rates but not the base 
nor the threshold at which tax would be paid. Income taxes on divi-
dends and saving would still accrue to the United Kingdom, as would 
tax on inheritance and capital gains; national insurance, also levied 
in incomes, would also be retained. Half of Value Added Tax in Scot-
land would be assigned to the Scottish Parliament, which would also 
be able to vary air passenger taxation. There would be some limited 
devolution of welfare benefits but the main benefits, which are being 
consolidated into a new Universal Credit, would be reserved for the 
centre. These proposals were welcomed by the business community 
but criticized by trade unions and the voluntary sector as not giving 
Scotland the power to promote social and economic equality or to 
look at taxes benefits and labour markets together. They are a long 
way from devo-max as that is normally understood. In January 2015, 
the Smith proposals were published as draft legislative clauses in a 
document with the optimistic subtitle ‘An Enduring Settlement’. A 
widespread view in Scotland was that these, too, had been drawn up 
in haste and would probably not be accepted by the next UK Parlia-
ment after the elections of May 2015, so that the issue remains live.
EVEL and Barnett
The Scottish referendum debate had, meanwhile, sparked a reaction in 
England. English opinion had hitherto been rather tolerant in respect 
of Scotland, accepting devolution and, to some degree, even relaxed 
about the prospect of independence. The campaign saw a hardening 
of English opinion, not so much about Scottish self-government but 
about the role of Scotland within UK politics, focusing on two issues. 
The first is the West Lothian Question, or the fact that Scottish MPs at 
Westminster can vote on purely English matters while the equivalent 
18. The Smith Commission, https://www.smith-commission.scot/
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matters in Scotland are the competence of the Scottish Parliament. The 
Conservative Party is sympathetic to the West Lothian complaint, since 
it has only one Scottish MP, and has proposed to address it though 
English Votes for English Laws (EVEL). This would mean that only Eng-
lish MPs would vote on laws that only affect England. Some union-
ists have long opposed this on the grounds that it would create two 
classes of MP and rupture the unity of Parliament. Arguably, however, 
there are already two classes of MPs, since English MPs cannot vote on 
matters that have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Labour 
is vehemently opposed to any attempt to curtail the voting rights of 
Scottish MPs, which is not surprising because most of these are Labour. 
The same issue had tormented William Ewart Gladstone, when he had 
proposed home rule for Ireland in the nineteenth century and it was 
never resolved at that time. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coali-
tion had established a commission to look at these proposals under Sir 
William Mackay.19 Its report recommended that English-only bills be 
considered by a parliamentary committee consisting of only English 
MPs (or English and Welsh ones where it was an England and Wales 
matter). The final vote, however, would be taken in the whole House 
of Commons, which could reverse any changes made in the commit-
tee. In January 2015, Conservative minister William Hague unveiled 
stronger proposals, wich would give English MPs an effective veto 
over legislation affecting only England. There is an argument about 
how much difference any of this would make, since it has been rare 
for a government enjoying a majority in the House of Commons not 
also to have a majority among English MPs.20
The issue has, however become important for English Conserva-
tives, who think that too many concessions have been made to Scot-
land and insisted that this be a condition for implementing the Smith 
proposals. Although the Hage proposals are not officialy linked to 
implementation of the Smith report, in the minds of Conservative 
MPs, the link has been made. 
The second issue is the distribution of funding among the nations 
and regions of the United Kingdom. As none of the three devolved 
territories so far has had significant tax-raising powers, all depend 
on transfers from Westminster. These are determined by the Barnett 
19. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/mckay-commission
20. In the post-war period it has happened only in the short parliaments of 1964-66 and 
February-October 1974. 
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Formula, which was introduced in the 1970s in anticipation of the 
devolution that never happened and retained afterwards to set most 
spending for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, then governed by 
the respective Offices. Barnett takes existing expenditures as the base 
and then distributes any increases or decreases according to popula-
tion, based on the equivalent increases or decreases in England. His-
torically, Scotland had higher spending levels than England or Wales 
for a variety of reasons. There were traces of an earlier population-
based formula (the Goschen Formula) while spending had not been cut 
to reflect Scotland’s falling relative population. Because of Scotland’s 
strategic political position, successive Secretaries of State had been 
able to bargain in Cabinet and with the Treasury for extra spending, 
without cuts elsewhere in the allocation. The application of Barnett 
should over time have eliminated this advantage, since the population-
based element would have become larger in relation to the historic 
element. In practice, this did not happen fully,21 so that Scotland’s 
expenditure differential survived to the present. There are two ways 
of looking at this. One could say that Scotland gets more than its ‘fair 
share’ of expenditure. On the other hand, if one counts North Sea oil 
receipts, Scotland over the medium term covers its expenditures, so 
that Scotland is subsidizing the poorer parts of the United Kingdom. 
Politically there seems to be an unspoken understanding that, as long 
as North Sea oil revenues cover the differential spending for Scotland, 
things will be left alone. 
Whatever its real effects, Barnett has become short-hand for 
the complaint that Scotland gets more than its fair share of fund-
ing. During the referendum campaign, unionist parties had created a 
trap for themselves in arguing, in Scotland, that Scots get more than 
their fair share and that this would continue while arguing elsewhere 
that funding is distributed according to need. The latter claim, ar-
ticulated by Labour, is patently untrue since needs do not, and never 
have, featured in the Barnett calculations. Both causes were taken 
up by Conservative MPs already uneasy over Europe and the Barnett 
question was also pursued in Wales. At a time of public expenditure 
retrenchment, this has become a zero-sum game. The unionist par-
ties, in their ‘vow’ and in the Smith report, indicated that Barnett will 
continue to govern that part of Scotland’s expenditure not covered by 
21. It is not clear why this is so, but there appears to be a failure fully to adjust for 
population, together with some ‘formula by-pass’ as Secretaries of State were still able 
to make a special case. 
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devolved taxation but it is not at all clear what this means in practice 
or how Barnett will be recalculated. There are currently no proposals 
for a needs-based formula to replace it. 
The European Context
One effect of the referendum campaign was to cement the image of 
Scotland as a pro-European country. Neither side questioned the desira-
bility of membership of the European Union, only whether it could best 
be secured through independence or union. Following the referendum, 
the Scottish Government has emphasised the need to secure a stronger 
position for Scotland in European negotiations and in paradiplomacy 
in general. Like some other sub-state governments in Europe, the Scot-
tish Government is able to participate in meetings of the Council of the 
European Union as part of the state delegation, by invitation of the UK 
Government on condition that it support a common bargaining posi-
tion. The Scottish Government has called for ‘direct’ representation, but 
this is not possible for bodies other than member states; in practice it 
seems to mean guaranteed representation in the UK delegation. More 
difficult, perhaps, is securing a Scottish influence in European consti-
tutional negotiate, at a time when the UK parties are committed to 
changing the UK relationship with Europe.22 Whether it will be possible 
for the UK to re-negotiate its relationship is an open question but to 
the extent that it does, Scotland may not want to go along with this. 
Successive Scottish governments have had a positive view on migration, 
which goes against the UK parties’ desire to restrict it. Yet the devolved 
governments have only been consulted on the ‘review of competences’ 
that has been seeking a UK position; they do not have a guaranteed say 
in the matter or a veto over changes. 
The Conservative Party is committed to repealing the UK Human 
Rights Act, which incorporates the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR, part of the Council of Europe) into UK law. This would 
create the anomalous position that the ECHR would be directly appli-
cable in Scotland to devolved matters (since it is incorporated under 
the act setting up the Scottish Parliament) but not in reserved mat-
ters. If some Conservatives have their way and the UK repudiates the 
22. The Conservatives are committed to a broad renegotiation while even Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats appear to accept changes in migration policies that could entail 
treaty change. 
The Scottish Independence Referendum and After
REAF núm. 21, abril 2015, p. 73-98
95
ECHR altogether, then matters would be even more difficult. Yet the 
Conservative proposals so far on the Human Rights Act have totally 
ignored the difficulties in Scotland (and Northern Ireland). 23
The Conservative Party further propose that, after negotiations 
with other member states, they would have a referendum in 2017 
about whether the UK should stay in or withdraw from the European 
Union. Surveys have shown that voters in Scotland are not strongly 
pro-European but they are less anti-European than those in England. 
This is not because they have made the connection between Europe 
and Scottish independence that the SNP make. SNP voters are not 
more pro-European than others; if anything it is Labour voters in 
Scotland who support Europe.24 There is not, however, the depth of 
anti-European feeling found in some other parts of the UK and no 
significant anti-European party.25 Scottish civil society is strongly pro-
European. There is therefore a realistic prospect that the UK could 
vote to come out of the EU but Scotland to stay in. The new First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon has suggested that withdrawal from the EU 
should require the consent of all four nations in the United Kingdom; 
more realistically, such a scenario could re-open the question of Scot-
tish independence to another referendum. This time, presumably, 
European institutional representatives would be less hostile to the 
Scottish case but it would still set an important precedent for other 
European cases. 
The Future of the State
The referendum may have buried the issue of Scottish independence 
for the time being but it has radically altered the internal politics of 
Scotland and the relationship of Scotland to the United Kingdom. 
Scotland has experienced its own form of protest against established 
parties and institutions – although paradoxically the SNP is itself a 
party of government and the Scottish Parliament an established in-
23. The Conservatives, Protecting Human Rights in the UK, London: Conservative Party, 
2014.
24. Michael Keating, The Independence of Scotland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009.
25. In the 2014 European elections, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) won 
in the UK as a whole, with 27 per cent of the vote. In Scotland it came fourth, with 10 
per cent, winning one seat. 
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stitution. Society has been repoliticized and new social movements 
have emerged; whether these can be sustained during more normal 
political times, without the spur of a referendum, remains to be seen. 
The constitutional issue can be seen as one of failed secession but 
one that has left the prospect of independence looking like a cred-
ible and realistic one. Alternatively, it can be presented as an instance 
of state rescaling, in which old ideas of the nation-state are giving 
way to a new and complex order of multiple layers of authority and 
policy-making.26 It also represents an instance of a broader European 
phenomenon of repoliticization of the public space in the face of a 
dominant ‘neo-liberal’ ideology that has sought to put certain issues 
beyond public debate and contestation. This is not an issue that will 
go away any time soon. 
26. Michael Keating, Rescaling the European State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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ABSTRACT
The Scottish independence referendum on 18 September 2014 produced an 
apparently decisive result, with 45 per cent for independence and 55 per 
cent against. Yet, it has not settled the constitutional issue. There was a 
huge public engagement in the campaign, which has left a legacy for Scot-
tish and UK politics. Scotland has been reinforced as a political community. 
The losing Yes side has emerged in better shape and more optimistic, while 
the winners have struggled to formulate the better autonomy package they 
had promised. Public opinion continues to favour maximum devolution short 
of independence. Scotland is a case of the kind of spatial rescaling that is 
taking place more generally across Europe, as new forms of statehood and 
of sovereignty evolve. Scottish public opinion favours more self-government 
but no longer recognizes the traditional nation-state model presented in the 
referendum question.
Keywords: Scottish Referendum; independence; devolution; spatial rescaling.
RESUM
Aparentment, el resultat obtingut pel referèndum per a la independència 
d’Escòcia del 18 de setembre de 2014 ha estat concloent: un 45 per cent a 
favor de la independència i un 55 en contra. Tanmateix, la qüestió constitu-
cional no ha quedat resolta. Durant la campanya s’ha generat un immens 
compromís públic que ha deixat un llegat per a les relacions polítiques entre 
Escòcia i el Regne Unit. Escòcia n’ha sortit reforçada com a comunitat polí-
tica. Els perdedors, partidaris del sí, han quedat reforçats i encaren el futur 
amb optimisme, mentre que els guanyadors han de lluitar per complir la 
promesa de millorar l’autonomia escocesa. L’opinió pública segueix estant 
a favor d’una “devolució” màxima, propera a la independència. Escòcia és 
un cas particular dins de la tendència que s’està desenvolupant a Europa 
de reformular el concepte d’estat amb l’aparició de noves formes d’estat i 
d’evolució de la sobirania. L’opinió pública escocesa estava a favor de més 
autogovern però no va voler acceptar el tradicional model d’estat nació que 
la pregunta del referèndum li va oferir.
Paraules clau: referèndum escocès; independència; devolució; noves formes 
d’estat. 
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RESUMEN
Aparentmente, el resultado obtenido por el referéndum para la indepen-
dencia de Escocia del 18 de septiembre de 2014 ha sido concluyente: un 45 
por ciento a favor de la independencia y un 55 en contra. Sin embargo, la 
cuestión constitucional no ha quedado resuelta. Durante la campaña se ha 
generado un inmenso compromiso público que ha dejado un legado para las 
relaciones políticas entre Escocia y el Reino Unido. Escocia ha quedado refor-
zada como comunidad política. Los perdedores, partidarios del sí, han salido 
reforzados y encaran el futuro con optimismo, mientras que los ganadores 
tendrán que esforzarse para poder cumplir la promesa de mejorar la autono-
mía escocesa. La opinión pública sigue estando a favor de una “devolución” 
máxima, cercana a la independencia. Escocia es un caso particular dentro de 
la tendencia que, de forma más general, se está desarrollando en Europa 
de reformular el concepto de estado con la aparición de nuevas formas de 
estado y de evolución de la soberanía. La opinión pública escocesa estaba a 
favor de más autogobierno pero no quiso aceptar el tradicional modelo de 
estado-nación que le ofrecía la pregunta del referéndum. 
Palabras clave: referéndum escocés; independencia; devolución; nuevas for-
mas de estado.
